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Society for East Asian Anthropology

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Illegibility and Immobility in the Social Lives of Muslim Migrants in Japan

July 31, 2025 by Yanping Ni

Society for East Asian Anthropology
John Ostermiller
March 28, 2025

Read the article on Anthropology News

Migration is not just about “getting there” but also “making it.” What does it feel like when you can’t fit in your host society as the “right” kind of migrant?

For countless Muslim migrants, Japan represents opportunity and a chance for upward mobility. Yet in a country often imagined as homogeneous and “secular,” what do opportunity and mobility look like? After all, migration is not just about “getting there,” but “making it.” How do race, power, and social class influence migrants’ experiences in Japan? 

Since the 1970s, Japanese society has increasingly relied on migrants to fill a variety of jobs, although the government has been slow to acknowledge or support them. Today, three million foreign residents make up about 3% of Japan’s total population. Between 2018 and 2023, foreign labor grew by over 40% with a growing number of workers coming from South and Southeast Asia. Although the Japanese government does not record the religion of migrants living in Japan, scholars estimate that 230,000 Muslims are living there as of 2020. While an increasing number of migrants coming to Japan are from the Muslim-majority countries of Malaysia and Indonesia—the largest Muslim country by population—the Muslim community in Japan is made up of migrants from all over the world.

Credit: John Ostermiller

A picture of the Shizuoka Mosque, a renovated warehouse with a decorate stone facade and geometric carvings along and inside the arched entrance to a bright blue wood and glass door. The sky is overcast.

View of the Shizuoka Masjid (Mosque), located on the western edges of Shizuoka City, the author’s primary fieldsite. Prior to the opening of the mosque in 2019, the local Muslim organization operated a prayer room out of its offices in downtown. Of the dozens of properties, they offered to buy, the only one who would sell to a Muslim organization was on the edge of the city.

“Passing” in Japanese Society

Narratives linking “blood” to “culture” shape the experiences of migrants in Japan. These narratives posit that Japanese “blood” is unique—and without it, one cannot “truly” understand Japanese culture—a perspective that extends to social perceptions of migrants.

In Japan, migrants aren’t called imin (immigrants), but rather gaikokujin (foreigners) or the abbreviated gaijin (outsiders). Historically, Japanese immigration policies have favored nikkeijin—foreigners of Japanese descent—with the assumption that their “partial” Japanese “blood” would give them an innate understanding of Japanese customs.  Unfortunately, nikkeijin have often faced harsh criticism for “looking Japanese” but not “acting Japanese.”

Foreign residents and Japanese of mixed ancestry try to “pass” as Japanese to avoid the stigma of being a foreigner. However, not all foreigners are treated equally in Japan. The Muslim migrants I interviewed mentioned that most Japanese people they encountered had little experience with Muslims or knowledge of Islam. They also discussed the unspoken interactional rules between Japanese and non-Japanese people: white westerners are often treated better than non-western, darker-skinned foreigners. In other words, migrant mobility in Japan is shaped by two factors: whether or not you can “pass” as Japanese, and what kind of foreigner you can “pass” as. 

In Japan, “whiteness” is highly desirable, and blonde-haired, blue-eyed white Western men are often seen as the “ideal” foreigners. Meanwhile, Blackness and darker skin are stigmatized. Being Muslim complicates this hierarchy. Because Japanese media often portrays “Muslims” as a homogenous group of Middle Eastern people prone to religious violence, Japanese people may conflate migrants’ religion with their “race,” or fear that Muslims’ customs pose a threat to Japanese communities. My friends Hamza and Madiha share their stories as Muslim migrants living in Japan who struggled with “passing” in various situations.

Credit: John Ostermiller

The parking lot adjacent to the mosque has been roped off in preparation for the morning prayers during Eid, June 2024. Large blue tarps cover the ground, with a view of the Mochimune harbor waterfront and green hills in the distance. A half dozen Muslim migrants are in the background underneath a semi-cloudy summer sky.

Preparing for Eid in June 2024 at the Shizuoka Mosque, a converted warehouse located along Mochimune harbor’s waterfront. Because of the small number of mosques in Japan, some Muslim migrants may only visit a mosque once or twice a year for Ramadan and The Feast of the Sacrifice (Eid).

Hamza: What is White Passing?

For many Muslim migrants, living in Japan is an exercise in adaptation. Life is not organized around the five daily prayers, mosques are rare, and finding halal food can be challenging. Hamza, a Palestinian English teacher living in Shizuoka for over 30 years, said it best: “To be frank, this is a country that doesn’t do things according to Islamic law. If you want to do things according to Islamic law, why the hell are you here?” Hamza moved to Japan after meeting his future wife on a flight to India where he was attending college.

When Hamza first arrived in Shizuoka in the 1990s, clusters of schoolchildren would excitedly shout “hullo!” and “gaijin!” (“outsider”) whenever they saw him in the neighborhood. Hamza felt that his appearance was a significant barrier to finding work in Japan because he “didn’t look white.” One of the most common jobs for foreigners in Japan—especially for white Westerners—is teaching English. Hamza is fluent in English. Growing up in 1960s Palestine, he used to translate TIME Magazine articles into Arabic with his friends. Despite his fluency, Hamza’s first job was assisting his father-in-law with his struggling roofing business.

Hamza attributed his difficulty in securing a teaching job to Japanese assumptions about race and ethnicity: “In Japan, there is a kind of complex that only whites and Westerners can be native English speakers.” Hamza and I crossed paths several times at the Shizuoka Mosque before he introduced himself, and I always assumed he was a Western expatriate living in Japan. While I perceived Hamza as “white passing,” many Japanese people did not share this view. 

For Japanese residents—especially those with limited personal experience with foreigners—Hamza is not perceived as white. Who counts as “white” is shaped not only by broad ideas of whiteness, but also by local assumptions about what white people “should” look like. In Hamza’s case, the expectation was that white foreigners should be blonde-haired and blue-eyed. His situation was further complicated by the portrayal of Palestinians in global media: “I couldn’t say I was Palestinian, right? Back in those days, people had the impression that Palestinians were guerillas. I couldn’t even say I was from the Middle East.” Racially ambiguous and unable to “pass,” Hamza struggled to find “real” work that paid a steady wage. With the help of his wife and in-laws, Hamza was able to secure a loan from a Japanese bank and open his own school. By marrying a Japanese citizen, Hamza gained the flexibility and mobility needed to work, live, and succeed in Japanese society.

Credit: John Ostermiller

An elevated view of the train tracks at Mochimune Station. Electrical polls and telephone wires criss-cross in the foreground, with snow-capped Mt. Fuji rising in the distance against a clear winter sky.

View of Mt. Fuji from Mochimune train station. Getting to Mochimune may only be a 10-to-20 minute train ride, but the mosque itself is another 15-to-20 minute walk from the station. Commuting to the mosque is one of the major issues for Muslims in Shizuoka.

Madiha: “I don’t even feel human sometimes”

Madiha’s experiences sharply contrast Hamza’s. Madiha, an African European woman in her twenties, is pursuing her PhD in a major Japanese city. Born to African immigrants, she grew up in a small European town. Madiha’s ethnicity, religion, nationality, and gender have complicated her life in Japan.

Madiha often feels conflicted about wearing her hijab. Numerous European countries have debated whether to allow Muslim women to wear “pious” religious garments like the hijab. At first, Madiha felt that Japan was a “safe” place to wear the veil, especially in the wake of Israel’s 2023 invasion of Palestine. However, her current relationship with Japan isn’t a “love-hate,” but rather “hate-hate.”

As a dark-skinned Muslim woman in Japan, Madiha is explicitly marked as a racial, religious, and gendered subject. In the United States, some Latine persons attempt to “pass” as white by changing their names and behavior. Likewise, African men in Japan have increased their social mobility by adopting African American names, fashion, and speaking styles. But for Madiha, this option isn’t viable. She doesn’t want to be seen as African American; she wants to be acknowledged as African European. Madiha described the surprise on her Japanese friends’ and acquaintances’ faces when she told them she was from Europe: “I could see the confusion on their faces. Like they were thinking, ‘She’s (European), but she’s Black. So, she’s not telling us where she really comes from.’” 

As a Black Muslim woman, Madiha deviates from the “ideal” foreigner archetype in Japanese society—typically envisioned as a white, presumably Christian or non-religious man. Madiha’s skin color and hijab are not “coded” as European in the minds of many Japanese people she encounters. While some African migrants successfully pass as Americans, this doesn’t work for Madiha. Madiha continues:

“Ever since I’ve been in Japan, I’m reminded of how Black I am. Or how foreign I am. And there are different layers. If you’re Asian  or white, it will be different… But you’re going to be praised, too. Not me. I’m an overweight, introverted Black woman. I’m not super cool. People always thought I was American. This American girl that is cool and sassy. And that is not what I am at all. I do not fit the stereotype. It was a struggle. It still is a struggle. I’m still perceived as someone that is dangerous [because I am Black and Muslim]. I don’t really feel like a woman here. I don’t even feel human even sometimes.”

This struggle to be accepted and acknowledged has impacted Madiha in other ways. After enduring constant staring—especially on trains where people would avoid sitting next to her—Madiha changed the way she wore her hijab. She experimented with different scarves and head wraps, hoping to look like just “another African migrant” rather than a dark-skinned religious foreigner. This also affected Madiha’s physical mobility: she rarely goes out and works from home whenever possible. Madiha attended mosque services a few times but stopped after receiving judgmental stares from Muslims who saw her without her hijab outside the mosque. Unable to ignore her religious convictions or make herself legible to her Japanese friends and colleagues, Madiha is stuck. She feels rejected by both her religious peers and Japanese society at large.

Migrant (Il)legibility and (Im)mobility

Hamza’s and Madiha’s experiences highlight how being Muslim in Japan complicates migrants’ abilities to pursue the opportunities that initially drew them to the country. Their stories bring to light the unspoken hierarchy of foreigners in Japanese society, revealing a clear preference for white, Western men. As a result, “making it” in Japan often requires migrants to alter their appearance, speech, and behavior. However, for pious dark-skinned Muslim women like Madiha, it is as impossible to change one’s skin color as it is unconscionable to take off one’s hijab. Understanding migrants’ experiences requires us to pay attention to how multiple factors—like race, religion, gender, class—shape the opportunities and challenges they encounter. This includes recognizing that Western ideas about whiteness permeate other countries as well. Although migrants may come to Japan for similar reasons, like professional or educational opportunities, their actual experiences in Japan can differ greatly.

Alex Wolff and Yanping Ni are the section contributing editors for the Society for East Asian Anthropology.

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Ambiguous Signaling: Filtering through Race and Language

July 31, 2025 by Yanping Ni

Society for East Asian Anthropology
Patty Lan
July 1, 2025

Read the article on Anthropology News

On the hunt for mooncakes for the Mid Autumn Festival in Seoul’s Daelim. Credit: Patty Lan

One day while taking the train in Seoul, two young Chinese girls were chatting in Cantonese, much to my excitement. It had been so long since I heard my native language, and I was enjoying being able to understand everything they were saying. But then a young Korean man sitting nearby turned and shouted at them in Korean to be considerate and to be quiet. The joy I felt in that moment evaporated. Even though they were not the only ones talking on the train, the Chinese girls bore the sole responsibility of being “noisy.” The immediate transformation of their attitudes from lighthearted to ashamed burned itself into my memory. During my year in South Korea from 2023 to 2024, I began to be more wary of speaking Mandarin or Cantonese in public, unsure if I would be similarly chastised or judged.

This reminded me of a previous experience. I was chatting with two Eastern European alumni of the Global Korea Scholarship program (GKS) over beer and rotisserie chicken at a restaurant in Seoul, when they looked me straight in the eye and gave me some advice for my interactions with Koreans. “You should only say you are American and keep the Chinese part a secret.” It was mainly said in jest, as the statement was accompanied with some laughter. But looking back at it now, it served as a warning that the South Korea I was in now, was very different from the South Korea I had visited 10 years prior.   

In recent years, sinophobia in South Korea has increased dramatically, arguably surpassing age-old anti-Japanese sentiment. Partially due to growing economic and military tensions, Covid-19, and South Korean conservative talking points, in South Korean society, even among the younger generations, there is a growing perception that China is an authoritarian communist threat that needs to be contained. China’s continued economic and geopolitical aggression seems to existentially jeopardize South Korea’s democratic sovereignty, with conservatives united in their accusations of Chinese interference in South Korean elections. These perceptions are bolstered by popular media depictions of Chinese migrant communities in South Korea, who are often portrayed as gangsters or criminals that threaten the civility and peace of South Korean society. In addition to sinophobia, xenophobia more generally has escalated in the country in response to the large numbers of migrant workers and brides from Southeast Asian countries who were initially welcomed into the country as solutions to South Korea’s growing low-fertility and labor problems. Research is increasingly demonstrating that despite government efforts to help these communities integrate into South Korea society, entrenched racism and cultural paternalism persist. This may be partially due to the possibility that government policies relying on western frameworks of xenophobia and racism alone do not account for the discrimination Asian non-Koreans experience in South Korea. Research into the experiences of various migrant communities in South Korea reflect diverse historical, economic, gendered, and religious intersections which contextualize these disparate experiences. 

Photograph of a shopping area

A banner titled “Daelim Central Market” in Korean welcoming visitors to various shops with banners in Chinese and Korean characters. I participated in a walking tour of Daelim Chinatown which included a lecture on the history and development of the neighborhood and key functions of local businesses. It ended with a delicious meal at a local restaurant. It is run by a South Korean nonprofit organization meant to better educate the South Korean public about multicultural communities. Credit: Patty Lan

Two hundred years of engagement with the West through trade, colonialism, imperialism, militarization, and aid has combined with the region’s history of Confucian patriarchy and geopolitical positioning between China and Japan to produce a dynamic practice of racialization. Racialization in Korea is largely tied to how a particular “race” signals the corresponding country’s economic status and their proximity to being a “western developed” country. This focus on “development” as a hierarchy juggling GDP, education, technological advancement, and cosmopolitan values expands upon typical western conceptions of race focused on skin color. While colorism is present in South Korean society, it is often in combination with discrimination against “developing countries.” As labor and marriage migrants have increased, the government has taken to branding them as “multicultural families” or” 다문화 가족” in order to integrate them into South Korean society. However, government-sponsored reality TV programming about these families reinforces the stereotype of the submissive wife from the Global South performing care work while migrants from the Global North are shown to be men working in more high-skilled jobs. Even different parts of the Korean diaspora are treated unequally. Korean Americans are granted visa privileges which allow for long-term work and residency permits whereas their counterparts in Northern China are only offered single five-year work visas despite both diasporas being sizable multigenerational Korean ethnic communities. The feelings of contempt and paternalism directed at “poor developing” countries reinforces a racializing hierarchy of who and how one gets to be a legitimate person in South Korean society. 

While on a walk in a busy university neighborhood in Seoul with a white French friend from Mauritania, we were stopped by an older Korean lady who walked straight out of a cafe to talk to my friend. As total strangers, the Korean woman tried to explain to my friend that she was writing an email and needed someone to help her edit her English. When we understood what was happening, my friend corrected the lady, telling her that she was French and her English was very poor, but that I, her Asian-looking friend, was from the US and would be much more helpful. The lady was a bit confused but was relieved to have some help as we walked back inside the cafe and I edited her email. 

In South Korean society, language is a key process through which race becomes materialized, negotiated, and transformed. Raciolinguistics, while initially developed with a US and white settler context in mind, recognizes the socio-political relationship between race and language. Building on this approach, the South Korean context offers a useful case for thinking about how English’s relation to whiteness can expand and complicate processes of racialization. English in South Korea is a prestigious language, with South Korean parents spending up to $2,000 USD per month to have their children start learning English as early as four years old. Simply appearing white allows some foreigners to have an easier time getting hired as English tutors, in contrast to their darker skin or Asian counterparts who come from English-speaking countries. Even with English, there are hierarchies which place American English, spoken by white Americans at the top, affordable only to the most wealthy of South Korean parents, and at the bottom, other forms of accented English available at alternative locations like the Philippines and Singapore for aspiring middle-class families. 

The Korean language also serves as an avenue of racialization. In experimental bilingual elementary schools for migrant children where Mandarin is offered as a language course, researchers noticed how use of Chinese outside of the classroom and creative hybrid experimentations often get labeled as linguistic deficiencies. The result is a language hierarchy which positions Korean as the only legitimate language of the classroom, despite claims of bilingual learning. How Korean is spoken is also racially marked. For North Korean refugees in South Korea, they experience discrimination for their accent, with some even being confused for Chinese. Ethnic Koreans born in China (Joseonjok) returning to South Korea as labor migrants and ethnic Chinese born in South Korea (Hwagyo) experience similar linguistic bias over their accented Korean, with South Koreans viewing their accents as signals of their inherent “Chineseness” or “backwardness”. Here, Sinophobia materializes and is transformed through the overlapping of Chinese racialization and “Chinese linguistics,” marking all who speak Chinese or speak “Chinese-accented” Korean.

Photograph of an event

A white booth tent for an outdoor festival with banners titled, “Environmental Preservation with Foreigners” and “Korean Scholarship Alumni Association”. This is a photo of the GKS Alumni booth at the Environmental Sustainability Festival in Busan. Our booth was called “Environmental Preservation with Foreigners.” We played Indian board games and passed out South Asian snacks to Korean elementary school students and their parents. Credit: Patty Lan

Coming back to South Korea in 2023 as a researcher on Fulbright, I often introduced myself as an American first, to give legitimacy to my status as a doctoral student from the US. However, as I met more GKS students and alumni, most of them coming from what Koreans consider the “developing world” such as Uganda, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand, I realized how much my Americanness, English-use, and perceived “Koreanness” created a wall between us. All of them at our initial meeting thought I was Korean. After being in South Korea for so long, “Koreanness” to them had come to mean a dominant status quo that marginalized and othered them. Once I corrected people and told them that I was Chinese American, the conversation shifted. 

Then I became “the American,” a rootless cosmopolitan from the Global North who existed as a privileged class in South Korea. But when I shared that I also spoke fluent Cantonese and Mandarin, the mood shifted again. “Hey, you are a real Chinese!”, they would say. After verifying my Chineseness, GKS recipients I talked to would immediately tell me about their affectionately close relationships with Chinese friends from school or work and show off all the things they learned about China through their friends. Being able to speak “Chinese,” the GKS community felt solidarity with me in a way I had not expected. In our conversations, they spoke more openly with me about their struggles in South Korean society, and their honest thoughts about their fellow classmates, colleagues, and superiors. “Koreans are toxic” was not an uncommon phrase. They also asked me a lot of questions about being Chinese in the US and what it was like to maintain my Chinese language skills, observe cultural practices, and survive as a low-income family. I served as a kind of portal into the future of what their lives and their children’s lives might look like if they continued to stay abroad. Being “Chinese” in these spaces meant identifying with collective struggles of migration, discrimination, and class. 

Outside of the GKS community, I felt racially ambiguous in a way I had never felt in the US. Being surrounded by the hums of Korean being spoken everywhere, I felt my Chinese identity retreat the more I did not speak Cantonese or Mandarin. In my frustration, during one of my participant observations sessions at a local festival where GKS alumni were running an “Interact with a Foreigner” booth, I introduced myself as Chinese in Korean to two grade-school aged Korean girls. Both stared at me in shock when I said I was Chinese and immediately denied my claim. So I switched to Mandarin to prove to them who I was, and one of the little girls, who had actually lived in China briefly because of her dad’s job, was able to verify who I was and excitedly started to talk to me in Mandarin. I felt seen. Language continued to be a tool for me to negotiate and navigate these fluctuating racial identities of belonging and otherness. 

I felt like I was living in two different worlds. One where I was Chinese, and another where I was Korean. As long as I paid attention to the right signals, I would be reminded of my potential for unsettling the sonic landscape, like when the two Cantonese-speaking women were scolded on the train. I often wondered what would have happened if it were me instead. How would I have reacted? I also wondered if my Chinese racialization would have been further complicated if I had been from Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Singapore instead. My research in South Korea, examining the racial politics of development and education, ended up leading me back to reflect deeply on my own racialized identity in the context of Asia. In the same place where I had the privilege to disappear into the crowd, I could also signal myself as cosmopolitan, or signify as an insidious Chinese authoritarian takeover. My experiences negotiating and transforming racial signaling through language in South Korea highlight the significance of (East) Asia’s regional and global histories, development aspirations, and geopolitics in understanding racialization beyond a western framework.  

Alex Wolff and Yanping Ni are the section contributing editors for the Society for East Asian Anthropology.

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CFP “Signal/Noise” Anthropology News & Society for East Asian Anthropology (SEAA)

February 20, 2025 by Yanping Ni

Hello all,



The Society for East Asian Anthropology’s (SEAA) column in Anthropology News is excited to invite abstract submissions for this quarter’s theme, “Signal/Noise.” As a section of Anthropology News (the American Anthropological Association’s member magazine), we select pieces to be published on its online forum, corresponding to themes chosen by AN as well as critical concerns of East Asia studies.



General CfP by Anthropology News (Full description available here)

We are looking for stories about how communities, cultures, and individuals distinguish meaningful patterns from background noise, interpret disruptions, and find (dis)connection amid interference. What counts as signal versus noise, and who gets to decide? How are fuzzy boundaries clarified or precarious structures disrupted? What happens when communication is